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Summary
Background The goal of universal health coverage (UHC) requires inter alia that families who get needed health 
care do not suffer undue financial hardship as a result. This can be measured by the percentage of people in 
households whose out-of-pocket health expenditures are large relative to their income or consumption. We aimed 
to estimate the global incidence of catastrophic health spending, trends between 2000 and 2010, and associations 
between catastrophic health spending and macroeconomic and health system variables at the country level.
Methods We did a retrospective observational study of health spending using data obtained from household 
surveys. Of 1566 potentially suitable household surveys, 553 passed quality checks, covering 133 countries between 
1984 and 2015. We defined health spending as catastrophic when it exceeded 10% or 25% of household consumption. 
We estimated global incidence by aggregating up from every country, using a survey for the year in question when 
available, and interpolation and model-based estimates otherwise. We used multiple regression to explore the relation 
between a country’s incidence of catastrophic spending and gross domestic product (GDP) per person, the Gini 
coefficient for income inequality, and the share of total health expenditure spent by social security funds, other 
government agencies, private insurance schemes, and non-profit institutions.
Findings The global incidence of catastrophic spending at the 10% threshold was estimated as 9·7% in 2000, 11·4% in 
2005, and 11·7% in 2010. Globally, 808 million people in 2010 incurred catastrophic health spending. Across 
94 countries with two or more survey datapoints, the population-weighted median annual rate of change of 
catastrophic payment incidence was positive whatever catastrophic payment incidence measure was used. Incidence 
of catastrophic payments was correlated positively with GDP per person and the share of GDP spent on health, and 
incidence correlated negatively with the share of total health spending channelled through social security funds and 
other government agencies.
Interpretation The proportion of the population that is supposed to be covered by health insurance schemes or by 
national or subnational health services is a poor indicator of financial protection. Increasing the share of GDP spent 
on health is not sufficient to reduce catastrophic payment incidence; rather, what is required is increasing the share 
of total health expenditure that is prepaid, particularly through taxes and mandatory contributions.
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Introduction
Although, globally, the share of health spending by patients 
themselves at the point of care (so-called out-of-pocket 
payments) has been falling, out-of-pocket spending as a 
share of income has not been declining. This fact has 
prompted concerns about the two aspects of universal 
health coverage (UHC): first, that everyone—poor and rich 
alike—should receive needed health care (referred to as 
service coverage);1 and second, that families who do get 
needed care do not suffer undue financial hardship as a 
result (referred to as financial protection).2 Strong 
performance on one UHC dimension does not guarantee 
strong performance on the other. A low incidence of 
catastrophic payments (ie, out-of-pocket payments that are 
especially large relative to a family’s total income or 
consumption) might reflect people getting needed care but 
being protected from out-of-pocket costs. However, a low 
incidence of catastrophic payments could also mean 
people not getting (and not paying for) needed care. The 
two dimensions of UHC need to be examined together.
The second dimension of UHC (financial protection) 
can be captured through two indicators.2,3 In this Article, 
we aimed to present global estimates for one of 
these indicators—namely, catastrophic out-of-pocket 
spending. This measure is the official indicator for 
monitoring of UHC financial protection among the 
Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs; indicator 3.8.2), 
with large expenditure suggested to be defined as 10% 
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and 25% of total household expenditure. A companion 
paper4 presents results for the second widely used 
indicator of financial protection—namely, medical 
impoverishment.3,5 Impov er ish ment is not an official 
SDG indicator but supplements the catastrophic 
payment indicator by trying to highlight the poverty 
implications of out-of-pocket spending.
Our study updates and extends two previous global 
studies undertaken in 20036 and 2007.7 We use the 
official SDG definitions for catastrophic payments and 
include data for 133 countries (median year 2010). We 
estimate annual average changes in incidence of 
catastrophic spending for 94 countries and report global 
and regional estimates for 2000, 2005, and 2010. We 
also use multiple regression methods to search for 
macroeconomic and health system variables that are 
associated with the incidence of catastrophic spending 
at the national level. We also aimed to investigate the 
degree to which catastrophic payment incidence is 
associated with coverage by a health insurance scheme 
or by a national or sub national health service,8 an 
indicator proposed by some but rejected by others as a 
possible measure of UHC.9
Methods
Catastrophic payments as a measure of financial hardship
We focused on one measure of financial hardship 
that has been used widely in previous studies,3,6,7,10–16 
typically referred to as catastrophic health expenditure. 
Catastrophic spending can be measured in different 
ways (appendix). The idea is, in effect, to measure the 
incidence of financial hardship caused by health 
payments—ie, the number of households with health 
spending that is large relative to their ability to pay.
There is no right or wrong way to measure ability to 
pay. One key question is whether it is reasonable to 
expect households to borrow or use savings to finance 
their health spending, as many do.17,18 If the answer 
Research in context
Evidence before this study
In a global study of catastrophic spending from 2007, which 
was based on data from 116 health surveys covering 
89 countries and with a median survey year of 1997, 
catastrophic spending was defined as spending that absorbs 
more than 40% of total consumption, net of an allowance for 
food expenditures. This threshold was set equal to average 
food spending among households in which the food spending 
share (as a percentage of total consumption) was in the 
45th to 55th percentile range, the assumption being that, 
at least in low-income and middle-income countries, the daily 
food intake of this group averages 2000 kcal. The study 
reported mean and median catastrophic spending incidence 
of 2·3% and 1·5%, respectively, and estimated that 150 million 
people globally incur catastrophic spending annually. 
Catastrophic spending was (partly) correlated with the share 
of prepayment in total health spending (negative) and the 
Gini coefficient for income (positive), and in low-income and 
middle-income countries with the share of gross domestic 
product (GDP) devoted to health (positive).
Added value of this study
We not only used the official Sustainable Development Goal 
(SDG) indicator for financial protection but also compared our 
results with findings obtained when catastrophic spending was 
defined as occurring if out-of-pocket spending exceeded 40% of 
non-food consumption—a definition that is close to the one 
used in two previous global studies. Our data are more recent 
than those used in two previous studies from 2003 and 2007, 
extend country coverage from 89 to 133, report trend data for 
94 countries, and estimate catastrophic spending incidence 
globally for 3 years—2000, 2005, and 2010. As in the 
two previous studies, we analysed country-level correlates of 
catastrophic spending incidence, but did so using 553 datapoints 
rather than 116, and explored how catastrophic payments vary 
with the share of total health spending channelled through 
different types of publicly and privately financed prepayment 
arrangements. We also investigated the degree to which 
catastrophic payment incidence was associated with the fraction 
of the population covered by a health insurance scheme or by a 
national or subnational health service, an indicator suggested as 
a possible measure of universal health coverage (UHC).
Implications of the available evidence
In roughly half of countries, the incidence of catastrophic 
spending has been rising, at both the 10% and 25% thresholds, 
whereas in around 40% of countries, catastrophic spending 
incidence has been increasing using the non-food measure. 
However, for all measures, the population-weighted median 
annual rate of change of catastrophic payment incidence has 
been positive. The incidence of catastrophic spending varies 
considerably across countries at any given point in time. 
This variation does not reflect differences in the share of the 
population covered by a health insurance scheme or by a 
national or subnational health service: variations exist among 
countries officially covering the entire population, and incidence 
changes over time during periods when health coverage 
arrangements and rates have not changed. What coverage rates 
miss, and catastrophic payment incidence captures, is the extent 
of de jure and, more importantly, de facto coverage of different 
services. Just increasing the share of GDP spent on health does 
not seem to be sufficient to provide financial protection. We find 
that the incidence of catastrophic payments decreases with both 
the share of health spending that is channelled through social 
security funds and the share channelled through other 
government financial protection arrangements; evidence 
suggests that the negative association is stronger for 
government financial protection arrangements.
See Online for appendix
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is no, ability to pay should be measured using 
current income. If the answer is yes, then the 
household’s health expenditure—even if financed out 
of borrowing—represents resources available to the 
household, and ability to pay should be measured by 
total consumption gross of health spending. The 
answer could depend on what type of care is being 
purchased: a government might be reluctant for 
households to have to borrow or use savings for 
acute medical care but be comfortable about them 
contributing from their savings towards the cost of 
long-term elder care. The choice of yardstick matters 
less for the overall incidence of catastrophic spending 
than for the measurement of inequality in catastrophic 
spending, with a consumption-based measure of ability 
to pay leading to more pro-rich inequality than an 
income-based measure. In any event, because in low-
income and middle-income countries it is difficult to 
measure income with any accuracy, we have little choice 
but to use consumption, except in a few countries for 
which consumption is not available; we, therefore, do 
not report results on inequality in the incidence of 
catastrophic spending in this Article.
However ability to pay is measured, the question arises 
as to whether there should be some adjustment for 
essential items of spending. In some studies, researchers 
have subtracted from consumption food spending3 or 
an allowance for food spending6,7 to capture the fact 
that poorer households have fewer resources to devote 
to non-nutritional needs. Both approaches overlook, 
however, other non-discretionary spending—eg, related 
to clothing, shelter, and heating—that in some countries 
is even more important (relatively speaking) than 
food expenditure, including for poor populations.19 
Researchers on two studies tried to address this problem, 
but neither study is universally applicable, with one19 
being better suited to high-income countries and the 
other20 being better suited to low-income and middle-
income countries. In view of these difficulties, we 
used total consumption as our ability-to-pay measure, 
consistent with the official SDG indicator. We do, 
however, compare our results with data obtained with 
non-food consumption in the denominator (appendix)— 
a definition that gets close to that used in the previous 
two global studies.
The thresholds we used are the two proposed SDG 
thresholds: 10% and 25% of total consumption. The 
10% threshold is the more common of the two in 
empirical work to date, used in 41% of studies; only 6% 
used the 25% threshold (appendix). The 10% threshold is 
somewhat higher than the typical threshold used in 
national tax systems to ascertain whether out-of-pocket 
medical expenses are large enough to be tax deductible: 
in the USA the threshold is 10%, but in Greece and 
Switzerland the threshold is 5%, whereas in Canada and 
Korea the threshold is just 3%; in some countries, 
including Brazil and Colombia, there is no threshold.
Estimating catastrophic spending aggregates
The household surveys we use are nationally represen-
tative, so our analysis of a household survey leads directly 
to a national estimate of the incidence of catastrophic 
spending for that country in that year. We also estimated 
the regional and global incidence of catastrophic 
spending, using UN regions and three reference years: 
2000, 2005, and 2010. The process entailed estimating 
incidence at the country level, then aggregating up. 
We used surveys from up to 5 years before and up to 
5 years after to estimate incidence in each of the 
three reference years, using a mix of survey datapoints, 
imputation, extrapolation, and modelling as needed 
(appendix). Table 1 provides a breakdown of the types of 
country datapoints used to estimate the global and 
regional incidence of catastrophic payments. For 
example, for the reference year 2010, we used actual 
survey-based datapoints for 101 countries, for which at 
least one point was available between 2005 and 2015. 
Together, these countries represent 86·1% of the world’s 
population. For 54 of these 101 countries, the survey was 
undertaken in 2010, so we relied on the actual survey-
based estimate of the incidence of catastrophic payments. 
For the other 47 countries, we aligned survey estimates 
to the reference year by projecting the incidence of 
catastrophic payments, using the elasticity of catastrophic 
payments with respect to the aggregate share of 
out-of-pocket spending over total consumption based 
on national accounts data. For a remaining set of 
110 countries (accounting for 13·9% of the world’s 
population), we did not have a datapoint between 2005 
and 2015. For 23 of these 110 countries, we used the 
aggregate share of out-of-pocket spending over total 
consumption to estimate the value of catastrophic 
payments in the reference year. Finally, we imputed the 
incidence of catastrophic payments using the median 
regional value for the other 87 countries (9·8% of the 
world’s population). The country estimates for the 
reference year were then aggregated up to the regional 
and global levels to get the number of people experiencing 
catastrophic out-of-pocket expenditures. We then calcu-
lated the global and regional rates by expressing these 
numbers as a share of the relevant population, equivalent 
1995–2005 (reference 
year 2000)
2000–10 (reference 
year 2005)
2005–15 (reference 
year 2010)
Countries 
(n)
Proportion 
of global 
population 
(%)
Countries 
(n)
Proportion 
of global 
population 
(%)
Countries 
(n)
Proportion 
of global 
population 
(%)
Reference year point 27 38·4% 36 19·9% 54 31·4%
Two points within band 19 6·6% 29 54·0% 13 21·8%
One point within band 61 38·0% 48 15·5% 34 32·9%
Fitted 15 6·9% 11 0·8% 23 4·1%
Regional median 89 10·1% 87 9·8% 87 9·8%
Table 1: Categories of datapoints used for aggregation
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to taking a population-weighted average of the relevant 
country rates.
Aggregate correlates of catastrophic spending
We used multiple regression to investigate not only 
the partial relation between a country’s incidence of 
catastrophic out-of-pocket health expenditures but also 
various macroeconomic indicators and health system 
characteristics. We included two macroeconomic indica-
tors: gross domestic product (GDP) per person and the 
Gini coefficient for income inequality. We also included 
total health expenditure (THE) as a share of GDP. To 
capture the overall share of THE that is prepaid, and the 
mix across different prepayment programmes, we 
included the shares of THE spent by social security 
funds, general government agencies excluding social 
security funds (referred to hereafter as other government 
agencies), private insurance schemes, and non-profit 
institutions serving households.21 We postulated that, 
among public sources, what is likely to matter for 
catastrophic payment incidence is not the source of 
finance (ie, taxes, non-tax revenues, social insurance 
contributions, etc) but rather which agent spends the 
funds and how it operates—eg, the financial incentives 
it faces, who it covers, the agency’s pool size, the services 
the agency covers, the generosity of its coverage, and 
the contractual and payment arrangements it has 
with providers.
Household datasets
To measure a country’s incidence of catastrophic 
spending, we required microdata (ie, unit record data) 
from nationally representative household surveys 
containing information on out-of-pocket health spending 
and on total household consumption. We set out to 
assemble as large a dataset as possible of such surveys. 
We derived the dataset from household surveys available 
to us as of March, 2017. We undertook inventories of the 
microdata catalogues of the International Household 
Survey Network and the World Bank, and of several 
house hold survey collections. We also searched for house-
hold surveys online, and obtained microdata from 
household surveys used by other researchers.6,7 Through 
this process, we identified 1566 potentially suitable 
house hold survey datasets, from 155 countries. Of these, 
171 were inaccessible and 424 lacked key variables. The 
remaining 971 datasets were subject to a quality assurance 
process that entailed comparing consumption per person 
and the health budget share with World Bank and WHO 
data, then checking every datapoint and every country’s 
time series manually (appendix). At the end of this 
confirmation process, we were left with 553 datapoints 
from 133 countries spanning the period 1984–2015. 
These data points break down across countries (figure 1) 
and collections (appendix). Only one datapoint was 
available for 37 of 133 countries; the remaining 
96 countries had multiple surveys. The 133 countries in 
our final dataset accounted for 93% of the world’s 
population in 2015, with variation across UN regions: 
Africa (88%), Asia (95%), Europe (89%), Latin America 
and the Caribbean (89%), North America (100%), and 
Oceania (63%).
Ability to pay defined as total consumption or income
In low-income countries it is hard to measure income, 
in part because many families produce and consume 
some of their food on a family plot and this does 
not show as income.22 Consumption is, therefore, used 
more widely; we have used consumption in this 
Article except for a few middle-income and high-income 
countries, for which we have used income in the 
absence of data for consumption. Ideally, a consumption 
aggregate should capture consumption across a broad 
range of categories, such as that proposed by the 
Classification of Individual Consumption according to 
Purpose (COICOP), published by the UN Statistics 
Division, including the use value of durables and the 
value of the flow of services that the household receives 
from occupying its dwelling.22,23 We did not attempt to 
reconstruct a consumption aggregate for our datapoints, 
which would be a massive undertaking, but rather we 
relied on datasets for which an aggregate already exists.
Out-of-pocket spending
Out-of-pocket spending includes not only payments 
made by the user at the point of use but also cost-
sharing and informal payments, both in kind and in 
cash, but it excludes payments by a third-party payer.21 
Many household expenditure surveys include questions 
on health spending, but, being general surveys, most 
have some shortcomings in terms of identifying out-of-
pocket health spending. First, it is sometimes not clear 
whether the spending reported is gross or net of any 
reimbursement by third parties (eg, private insurance 
company or government agency), in which case out-of-
pocket spending could be over estimated. We excluded 
countries and surveys for which this uncertainty is a 
problem (eg, France), in case we overestimated the 
extent to which health spending is a source of financial 
hardship. Second, recall periods are sometimes 
inappropriate, particularly in general expend iture 
surveys, in which the last 3 months and the last 
12 months are used frequently, periods that are too long 
for items such as outpatient care and medicines. 
Multipurpose surveys are better in that spending 
data are gathered via a health module that varies 
recall period by type of service.24 Third, variations 
in comprehensiveness probably exist across surveys. 
A review of 100 survey questionnaires found that, in 
80% of surveys, questions were asked about spending 
on pharmaceutical products, hospital services, medical 
services, and paramedical services.24 Nonetheless, it 
is difficult to be sure the surveys are equally 
comprehensive.
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Data for macroeconomic and health system indicators
We obtained GDP and THE from the World Bank’s Open 
Databases and the Gini coefficient for income from 
Milanovic’s All the Ginis (ALG) dataset.25 We obtained 
proportions of THE channelled through social security 
schemes, other government agencies, private insurance, 
and non-profit institutions from WHO’s Global Health 
Expenditure Database (GHED). We filled gaps in the ALG 
and GHED datasets by carrying forward the most recent 
datapoint and carrying backward the oldest datapoint; for 
countries with data missing completely for the share 
of THE channelled through social security, private 
insurance, and non-profit institutions, we assumed they 
did not use the financing agency with missing data. 
Further details of data sources are in the appendix.
Role of the funding source
The funders had no role in study design, data collection, 
data analysis, data interpretation, or writing of the report. 
The corresponding author had full access to all data in 
the study and had final responsibility for the decision to 
submit for publication.
Results
The incidence of catastrophic out-of-pocket payments in 
the most recent surveys varied strikingly across countries. 
At the 10% threshold, incidence ranged from 0·3% in 
Zambia in 2010 to 44·9% in Lebanon in 1999 (figure 2A). 
Mean incidence across countries was 9·2% (SD 7·6) and 
median was 7·1% (IQR 3·4–13·4). Incidence was 
inevitably lower at the 25% threshold (figure 2B), with 
mean and median incidences of 1·8% (SD 2·1) and 1·0% 
(IQR 0·34–2·5), respectively. The rank correlation 
between the two catastrophic payment measures 
was 0·877, so for the most part low incidence at the 
10% threshold compared with other countries (which 
could be interpreted as good performance) was mirrored 
by low incidence at the 25% threshold compared with 
other countries, but exceptions were noted. Using non-
food consumption in the denominator and setting the 
threshold at 40% gave a population-unweighted mean 
catastrophic incidence of 2·1% (SD 2·7) and resulted in 
catastrophic payments being more concentrated in the 
world’s poorest regions—Africa and Asia (appendix). 
This alternative measure correlates less strongly with the 
official SDG measures than they do with each other (rank 
correlations are 0·554 and 0·709).
Aggregating across countries, estimates showed that, 
in 2010, 808·4 million people incurred catastrophic 
spending at the 10% threshold, equivalent to 11·7% of 
the world’s population (table 2). At the 25% threshold, 
these figures were 179·3 million people and 2·6% of 
the world’s population, and using 40% of non-food con-
sump tion as the threshold, the figures were 208·2 million 
people and 3·0% of the world’s population. Estimates 
for 2010 revealed variations across UN regions, with 
Latin America and the Caribbean having the highest 
incidence at the 10% threshold (14·8%), and Oceania 
having the lowest (3·9%).
Figure 3 shows the average annual change in the inci-
dence of catastrophic out-of-pocket payments at the 10% 
and 25% thresholds across all available surveys, for 
94 countries for which surveys were available for 2 years 
or more. At the 10% threshold, the average annual 
change ranged from –2·7% per year in Congo 
(Brazzaville [2005–11]) to 3·3% per year in Armenia 
(2010–13). In 48 of 94 countries, the incidence of 
catastrophic out-of-pocket spending increased over time. 
At the 25% threshold, catastrophic payment incidence 
rose in 54% of countries. The population-unweighted 
Figure 1: Data availability for catastrophic health expenditure, by country
Both 1996–2005 and 2006–15
Only 2006–15
Only 1996–2005
Only pre-1996
Dataset(s) analysed but discarded
Dataset(s) inadequate
No datasets identified
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median change in catastrophic out-of-pocket payment 
incidence was 0·03% per year (IQR –0·18 to 0·41) for the 
10% threshold and 0·01% per year (–0·05 to 0·07) for the 
25% threshold, whereas the population-weighted figures 
were 0·45% per year (–0·13 to 1·02) and 0·22% per year 
(0·00 to 0·31), respectively. The discrepancy in these 
values indicates that catastrophic payment incidence has 
been falling more slowly or rising more quickly in more 
populous countries. The rank correlation between the 
annual average changes in the two catastrophic payment 
measures was 0·880; thus, for the most part, relative 
improvements at the 10% threshold were mirrored 
by relative improvements at the 25% threshold. 
Counter examples exist, however (figure 3); Tanzania 
and Uganda, for example, have achieved quite large 
reductions in catastrophic spending at the 10% threshold 
but not at the 25% level, whereas at the other end of the 
chart Bulgaria and Moldova have seen catastrophic 
payment incidence rising at the 10% threshold but not at 
the 25% threshold.
The trend in annual average change was more 
encouraging if the sample was restricted to 2005 and 
onwards. The population-unweighted median annual 
changes in incidence of catastrophic out-of-pocket 
payments were –0·07% per year (IQR –0·36 to 0·27) for 
the 10% threshold and –0·00% per year (–0·08 to 0·08) for 
Figure 2: Incidence of catastrophic health spending at the 10% (A) and 25% (B) thresholds, latest year
15–45%
10–14%
6–9%
3–5%
0–2%
No data
3·2–11·5%
1·5–3·1%
0·7–1·4%
0·2–0·6%
0·0–0·1%
No data
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9
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the 25% threshold; however, the population-weighted 
figures remained positive at 0·27% per year (–0·08 to 2·01) 
and 0·10% per year (–0·00 to 0·57), respectively. The trend 
in annual average change was also more encouraging with 
the non-food version of the catastrophic payment indicator: 
catastrophic payment incidence increased in only 38% of 
countries, whereas the population-unweighted median 
rate of change was –0·05% per year (IQR –0·15 to 0·04); 
the population-weighted median, however, remained 
positive at 0·04% per year (–0·00 to 0·45).
Globally, the number of people incurring catastrophic 
payments increased between 2000 and 2010, whichever 
threshold was used and whether or not total con-
sumption or non-food consumption was used in the 
denominator (table 2). At the 10% threshold, the number 
of people incurring a catastrophic payment increased 
from 588·5 million (9·7% of the world’s population) in 
2000 to 741·3 million (11·4%) in 2005, rising to 
808·4 million (11·7%) in 2010. A similar pattern was 
evident in the numbers for the 25% threshold and 
indicator. The global trend estimates were based on 
estimates for all countries, including those that had 
limited trend data or no data. The pattern of a global 
increasing incidence of catastrophic payments was, 
however, consistent with the population-weighted 
estimates for countries with at least 2 years of data for 
catastrophic payments. The incidence of catastrophic 
payments has evolved differently across the various 
UN regions: the global rise in catastrophic payment 
incidence has been driven by increases in Africa and Asia; 
North and South America—and for some indicators, 
other regions too—have seen reductions.
Incidence of catastrophic spending can vary across 
countries with similar types of health system. Armenia, 
Azerbaijan, Canada, and the UK all officially cover 100% 
of their populations automatically with national or 
regional health services;8,26 yet the incidence of 
catastrophic payments was considerably higher in 
Armenia and Azerbaijan (16% and 8%, respectively, at 
the 10% threshold) than it was in Canada and the UK 
(3% and 2%, respectively, at the same threshold). The 
incidence of catastrophic payments also varied between 
Hungary (7%), South Korea (13%), Montenegro (9%), 
and Romania (12%), despite the fact that—in all four 
countries—100% of the population is officially covered 
by a national health insurance scheme.8,26 Moreover, 
even though—in these eight countries—arrangements 
and insurance coverage rates have stayed the same in 
recent years, incidence of catastrophic payments has 
not always remained unchanged; indeed, in some cases, 
a clear upward trend was evident (figure 3). The USA is 
a counter example: insurance coverage rates stayed 
largely unchanged over the period 1995–2013;27 yet, the 
incidence of catastrophic payments fell. Figure 3 also 
shows that when additional population groups acquired 
coverage in formal insurance schemes, the incidence of 
catastrophic payments did not always change in the 
expected direction: in Mexico, Thailand, and Vietnam, 
catastrophic payment incidence has indeed fallen as the 
fraction of the population with insurance coverage 
has expanded, but this effect has not happened in 
China, Indonesia, or the Philippines.13,14,28–30 In short, 
catastrophic payment incidence cannot be inferred 
from the fraction of the population covered by health 
insurance schemes or public health services. This 
conclusion is not sensitive to the definition of 
catastrophic expenditures used; the same conclusion is 
reached when using the non-food definition.
2000 2005 2010
Proportion of 
population (%)
Number of 
people (million)
Proportion of 
population (%)
Number of 
people (million)
Proportion of 
population (%)
Number of 
people (million)
10% threshold (total consumption)
Global 9·7% 588·5 11·4% 741·3 11·7% 808·4
Africa 8·7% 70·7 10·3% 94·1 11·4% 118·7
Asia 10·4% 381·6 12·2% 479·2 12·8% 531·1
Europe 6·5% 47·4 7·0% 51·2 7·2% 53·2
Latin America and the Caribbean 13·4% 70·5 17·5% 98·3 14·8% 88·3
North America 5·5% 17·2 5·3% 17·4 4·6% 15·6
Oceania 3·5% 1·1 3·4% 1·1 3·9% 1·4
25% threshold (total consumption)
Global 1·9% 112·8 2·4% 154·9 2·6% 179·3
Africa 1·5% 12·3 1·9% 17·7 2·5% 25·6
Asia 2·1% 77·1 2·8% 108·7 3·1% 128·7
Europe 0·9% 6·5 1·0% 7·3 1·0% 7·2
Latin America and the Caribbean 2·6% 13·6 3·2% 18·0 2·5% 14·9
North America 1·0% 3·1 0·9% 3·0 0·8% 2·6
Oceania 0·5% 0·1 0·4% 0·1 0·5% 0·2
Table 2: Global estimates of catastrophic spending
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Figure 3: Annual percentage point change in incidence of catastrophic health spending
Data were calculated using all surveys available for the country in question by regressing catastrophic expenditure rate on year of survey; the number shown is the 
coefficient from this regression. Surveys span the period 1984–2015, with a median year of 2005 (IQR 2001–2009). The median first year was 1998 and the median 
last year was 2010.
Armenia 2010–13
Chile 1997–2006
Morocco 1998–2006
Nigeria 2003–09
Yemen 1998–2005
Georgia 1997–2013
Nepal 1995–2010
Egypt 1997–2012
China 1995–2007
Jordan 2002–06
Argentina 1996–2004
Bulgaria 1997–2010
Moldova 1999–2013
Nicaragua 1993–2014
Estonia 1995–2010
Macedonia 1996–2008
Iran 2005–13
Latvia 2002–06
Romania 1998–2012
Belgium 1997–2010
India 2004–11
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Portugal 1990–2010
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Ireland 1999–2010
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South Korea 1999–2008
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Kenya 1997–2005
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Mali 2001–06
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Madagascar 2001–05
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Ghana 1991–2005
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Cameroon 1996–2014
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By contrast, incidence of catastrophic health spending at 
both the 10% and 25% thresholds was significantly and 
positively associated with GDP per person (table 3). 
Income inequality also had a positive partial association 
with catastrophic spending at all income levels, which 
became stronger at higher income levels. A positive partial 
association was noted between catastrophic spending and 
the share of GDP spent on health, but this association 
became weaker at higher income levels. A negative partial 
association was recorded between catastrophic spending 
incidence and the share of THE channelled through social 
security funds and other government agencies. These 
effects were stronger at higher income levels per person. 
The results suggest that an increase in the share of THE 
channelled through social security schemes might offer 
somewhat less financial protection than an increase in the 
share of THE channelled through other government 
agencies. By contrast with our results for govern-
ment agencies, no evidence was found to suggest that 
health spending channelled through private insurance 
and non-profit institutions provides financial protection.
Discussion
Our data show substantial variation across countries in 
the incidence of catastrophic spending in the most recent 
household survey, ranging from less than 1% to more 
than 40%. In the latest surveys (median year 2010), the 
median incidence of catastrophic spending was 7% at the 
10% threshold, 1% at the 25% threshold, and 2% with 
the 40% threshold of non-food. We found no evidence 
of any link between catastrophic payment incidence and 
the share of the population that is supposed to have 
health coverage, and we noted changes over time in 
catastrophic payment incidence in countries, even during 
periods when health coverage rates had not changed. 
What coverage rates miss—and catastrophic payment 
incidence captures—are the extent of de jure and (more 
importantly) de facto coverage for different services. 
Coverage rates also miss the interaction between 
insurance coverage and provider incentives and, hence, 
the possibility that acquisition of coverage could leave 
people vulnerable to providers taking the opportunity to 
generate more income by delivering and charging for 
additional services, not all of which might be medically 
necessary.
Our regression results are—by their nature—
associations and do not necessarily reflect causation. The 
positive partial relation between catastrophic spending 
and the share of GDP spent on health could reflect, as 
previously postulated,7 greater service availability, more 
use of expensive technology, and higher prices, all 
of which are likely to be correlated positively with 
catastrophic payment incidence; the relation also suggests 
that simply spending more on health is not sufficient to 
provide financial protection. The negative correlation 
between catastrophic payment incidence and the share of 
health expenditure channelled through social security 
funds and other government agencies, but the absence of 
such an association in the case of private insurance 
and non-profit institutions, suggests an important role 
for public financial protection arrangements (funded 
by taxes and mandatory insurance contributions) and 
a questionable role for private ones (funded through 
voluntary premiums and contributions). The finding that 
catastrophic payment incidence is associated less strongly 
with spending through social security funds than with 
spending through other government agencies could 
reflect shallower coverage in social insurance schemes 
and higher inpatient admission rates and costs.8,31
Our findings on trends are mixed. The proportion of 
countries with rising incidence of catastrophic payments 
is 50% using the two SDG indicators and less than 50% 
with the version using non-food consumption. However, 
adjusting for population size produces a different picture. 
The population-weighted median annual rate of change 
of catastrophic payment incidence is positive whatever 
indicator is chosen. At the global level, we estimate that 
the number of people with catastrophic spending at the 
10% threshold 25% threshold
25th percentile Median 75th percentile 25th percentile Median 75th percentile
GDP per person, 2011 (intl$) 0·205 (p=0·04) 0·216 (p=0·02) 0·230 (p=0·01) 0·060 (p=0·05) 0·064 (p=0·03) 0·069 (p=0·02)
Gini index of income inequality 0·088 (p=0·04) 0·112 (p=0·01) 0·147 (p=0·02) 0·028 (p=0·01) 0·034 (p=0·0006) 0·042 (p=0·01)
THE (% of GDP) 0·728 (p=0·00) 0·682 (p=0·01) 0·616 (p=0·01) 0·165 (p=0·08) 0·161 (p=0·08) 0·154 (p=0·10)
Social security (% of THE) –0·061 (p=0·07) –0·120 (p=0·0004) –0·206 (p=0·0002) –0·017 (p=0·04) –0·035 (p=0·0010) –0·062 (p=0·0018)
Other government agencies (% of THE) –0·092 (p=0·01) –0·158 (p<0·0001) –0·252 (p<0·0001) –0·016 (p=0·04) –0·037 (p=0·0005) –0·066 (p=0·0009)
Private insurance (% of THE) 0·202 (p=0·35) 0·077 (p=0·66) –0·103 (p=0·45) 0·054 (p=0·41) 0·019 (p=0·71) –0·031 (p=0·42)
Non-profit institutions (% of THE) –0·106 (p=0·11) –0·149 (p=0·10) –0·209 (p=0·20) –0·028 (p=0·11) –0·030 (p=0·24) –0·034 (p=0·50)
Observations (n) 508 508 508 508 508 508
Social security=other government 
agencies (probability)
0·249 0·084 0·006 0·814 0·784 0·225
GDP=gross domestic product. THE=total health expenditure. 
Table 3: Multiple regressions showing marginal effects of macroeconomic and health systems characteristics on catastrophic spending incidence at different income levels per person
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10% threshold increased from 589 million (10% of the 
world’s population) in 2000 to 741 million (11%) in 2005, 
and continued to increase, albeit at a slower rate, 
to 808 million (12%) in 2010. Such an increase is 
also noted when using other thresholds (ie, 25%), but 
at a lower rate, and between 2000 and 2005 with 
other definitions of ability to pay (non-food with a 
40% threshold), but not between 2005 and 2010.
Our study has several limitations. First, our data come 
from various surveys. We have tried to minimise the 
risks associated with heterogeneity by focusing when 
possible on one collection for a given country, making 
use of ex post-harmonised datasets, and cross-checking 
basic summary statistics from our surveys with other 
sources. However, despite our efforts to minimise the 
heterogeneity of surveys within countries, differences in 
definition probably remain, including in the way ability 
to pay is measured: mostly, ability to pay is measured 
using consumption, but in some surveys it is measured 
using income. This discrepancy is one reason we have 
not reported results on inequality in catastrophic 
spending, which is highly sensitive to the choice. Second, 
we have not looked at persistency of the large out-of-
pocket expenditures over time within households. Panel 
data provide the best opportunity to assess this issue,32 
but availability of such data is very limited. With cross-
sectional data, richer information on health status of 
household members, and some assumptions about the 
variability of health expenditures over time faced by every 
household, measuring exposure to medical expenditure 
risk is possible,33 but such information is typically not 
available in the datasets we are using. Third, we do not 
include the indirect costs associated with care-seeking 
(eg, transportation costs) when estimating financial 
hardship, which can represent a substantial burden. 
Surveys without a particular focus on health-seeking 
behaviour (most of our surveys are household budget 
surveys or household income and expenditure surveys), 
do not have information on cost of transportation related 
to utilisation of health services. Fourth, care-seeking also 
has an opportunity cost beyond any monetary price—eg, 
income losses, assets depletion, and indebtedness. Our 
datasets do not allow us to capture these costs, so we are 
not able—as would be possible with a richer dataset—to 
adjust measures of financial protection to disentangle 
the short-term and long-term outcomes of coping with 
health-care cost. Findings of some studies with such 
richer datasets34 suggest that people might be able to 
cope with the cost of care but not with income losses, 
but evidence is scarce. Fifth, we do not have the space 
to discuss in detail the conceptual underpinning, 
advantages, and disadvantages of the different definitions 
of ability to pay used in this Article.19,20 Nonetheless, 
we find a regular pattern at the global level for all 
three measures—ie, an increase in the incidence of 
catastrophic expenditures. Sixth, our analysis shows 
merely one dimension of UHC. A low incidence of 
catastrophic spending might simply reflect a situation 
in which only a few people get the health care they 
need because facilities are few or inadequate; data for 
both sides of the UHC coin need to be examined 
simultaneously. Finally, even though we have more 
than four and a half times as many datapoints as the 
previous global study, there are still gaps—some 
countries are absent, some have only one datapoint, and 
some are quite old. As such, our global estimates are 
produced using a combination of survey-based data-
points, interpolated and extrapolated datapoints based on 
econometric modelling, and imputation using regional 
medians. Therefore, we did not attempt to conduct 
inference around our global estimates. Uncertainty 
around our estimates comes from both sampling error 
around the survey-based datapoints and non-sampling 
error associated with the modelled estimates used to 
align the incidence of catastrophic payments to a specific 
reference year.
In conclusion, while catastrophic payment incidence 
has been falling in around half of countries using the 
SDG indicators, and in more than half of countries using 
the non-food version of the catastrophic payment 
indicator, the population-weighted median annual rate of 
change of catastrophic payment incidence has been rising 
whatever indicator is chosen. At the global level, we 
estimate that 808 million people (12% of the world’s 
population) incurred catastrophic health spending at the 
10% threshold. This figure is higher than it was in 2000 
(599 million [10%]) and in 2005 (741 million [11%]). The 
incidence of catastrophic payments varies considerably 
across countries. This variation does not reflect the 
share of the population that is supposed to be covered 
by health insurance or national or subnational health 
services, making catastrophic payments an un informative 
indicator of financial protection and pointing to the need 
to look beyond it when designing health system reforms 
aimed at accelerating progress towards UHC. Greater use 
of prepayment, particularly through social security funds 
and other government agencies, is likely to be key—not 
merely covering more people but covering a larger share 
of total health spending.
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